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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is Lawrence Olson's second appeal from the district court's summary 
dismissal of his claims for post-conviction relief. In the first appeal, the Court of Appeals 
remanded this case after the district court improperly dismissed several of Mr. Olson's 
claims without determining whether an attorney should be appointed to assist him in the 
development and presentation of many of his post-conviction claims. On remand, the 
district court appointed counsel, but did not give Mr. Olson or his attorney sufficient time 
to prepare for the further proceedings. The result was that post-conviction counsel was 
not adequately aware of what Mr. Olson's claims were, which meant Mr. Olson was 
effectively left to clarify and defend his claims without the assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Therefore, this Court should remand this case again so that Mr. Olson can 
actually receive the assistance to which he was entitled following the initial remand. 
Despite the deprivation of the assistance of counsel, Mr. Olson managed to 
articulate a genuine issue of material fact, asserting that he based his plea on a promise 
made to him by his initial trial attorney as to what sentence he would get, even without a 
plea deal from the State. As such, he should also receive an evidentiary hearing on that 
issue (as well as any other of his claims which, after sufficient assistance is given by 
counsel, also articulate valid claims). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Olson pied guilty to driving under the influence, with a persistent violator 
enhancement, and was sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence, with seven years 
1 
fixed. (Tr., Vol.6, p.3, L.6 - p.4, L.11; R., Vol.1 p.5.) 1 At the guilty plea hearing, the 
district court had Mr. Olson submit a guilty plea questionnaire. (Tr., Vol.6, p.1, 
Ls.20-23.) On that form, Mr. Olson indicated that his plea was premised on a promise. 
(R., Vol.1, p. 7 4.) He wrote that the promise arose from the fact that the State was not 
willing to participate in plea negotiations. (R., Vol.1, p.74.) He ultimately clarified that, 
given that situation, the first of his two trial attorneys had promised him he would receive 
a sentence with two to three years fixed, life indeterminate, concurrent with another 
sentence he was already serving. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.21 - p.40, L.2.) 
Mr. Olson also did not answer any of the questions regarding the nature of the 
plea agreement, nor the question about whether it was a conditional plea. (R., Vol.1, 
pp.73-74.) He did, however, indicate on the guilty plea questionnaire that there was 
1 As the current appeal is the second on Mr. Olson's first petition for post-conviction 
relief and the courts involved have been taking judicial notice of various record 
documents and transcripts, there are multiple, independently bound and paginated 
volumes containing the transcripts and record for this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the clerk's record and reporter's 
transcripts from the first post-conviction appeal, Docket No. 38042. (R., p.2.) To 
promote clarity, the record from Docket No. 38042 will be referred to as "R., Vol.1," and 
the record prepared for this appeal will be referred to as "R., Vol.2." The transcript 
volume from Docket No. 38042, which contains the transcript of the summary dismissal 
hearing held on January 19, 2010, will be referred to as "Tr., Vol.1." The volume from 
Docket No. 38042 containing the transcript of the evidentia.ry hearing held on August 
20, 2010, will be referred to as "Tr., Vol.2." The volume prepared for this appeal 
containing the transcript form the May 2, 2012, status hearing will be referred to as 
"Tr., Vol.3," and the volume prepared for this appeal which contains the transcript from 
the hearing "for Post Conviction Relief (see R., Vol.2, p.5), held on June 15, 2012, will 
be referred to as "Tr., Vol.4." 
Additionally, the district court took judicial notice of the transcripts from the 
underlying criminal case, including the transcript of the preliminary hearing, which are 
included in the file from the direct appeal of the judgment. of conviction (Docket No. 
35049). (Tr., Vol.4, p.68, Ls.16-24; Tr., Vol.4, p.59, L.23 - p.60, L.6.) As such, 
Mr. Olson has moved, concurrent with the filing of this brief, for the Idaho Supreme 
Court to also take judicial notice of those transcripts. To promote clarity, the volume 
containing the transcript of the preliminary hearing will be referred to as "Tr., Vol.5," and 
the volume containing the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings will 
be referred to as "Tr., Vol.6." 
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nothing additional he had requested his attorney do, including filing motions, and that 
there were no other witnesses who would show his innocence. (R., Vol.1, pp.71-77.) 
The district court took Mr. Olson's plea without asking any ·additional questions about 
the nature of the plea or about Mr. Olson's assertion that he had been made a promise 
which had influenced his decision to plead guilty. (See generally, Tr., Vol.6, pp.1-9.) 
After the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence on direct appeal, see 
State v. Olson, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No.748 (Ct. App. 2008), (hereinafter, Olson 
/), Mr. Olson filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., Vol.1, pp.5-28.) The district 
court entered an order dismissing the petition and gave Mr. Olson twenty days to 
respond. (R., Vol.1, pp.40-44.) After Mr. Olson filed his amended petition, (R., Vol.1, 
pp.45-50), the State moved for summary dismissal of Mr. Olson's petition. (R., Vol.1, 
pp.54-70.) The district court dismissed several of Mr. Olson's claims without first 
deciding whether counsel should be appointed. 
However, the district court did appoint counsel in regard to Mr. Olson's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel against his second trial attorney.2 (See R., Vol.1, 
pp.40-50, 85-87.) That claim was based on the alleged failure of that attorney to advise 
Mr. Olson of his right to remain silent during the presentence investigation. (R., Vol.1, 
p.101.) Mr. Olson was also able to pursue a claim at the evidentiary hearing which 
alleged that he had not voluntarily pied guilty due to his concern that the district court 
would impose a harsher sentence if he went to trial. (R., Vol.1, p.101.) Those two 
claims were fully litigated at that hearing and the district court ultimately denied them. 
(R., Vol.1, pp.130-31.) Mr. Olson appealed, challenging the district court's summary 
2 Several months into his case, Mr. Olson's first public defender retired, causing his 
case to be reassigned to a second trial attorney. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, L.24 - p.10, L.5.) 
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dismissal of the majority of his claims, as well as the denial of his two other claims. 
(R., Vol.1, pp.132-35.) 
Mr. Olson appealed the district courts decisions in that regard. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the denial of the two fully litigated issues, but remanded the case in 
regard to the remainder of the issues because the district court had improperly 
dismissed them before ruling on Mr. Olson's motion for counsel. Olson v. State, 2012 
Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9 (Ct. App. 2012), (hereinafter, Olson//). 
On remand, the district court appointed Mr. Olson counsel. (R., Vol.2, p.9.) At a 
status hearing, it asked post-conviction counsel how much time before he would be 
ready to proceed. (Tr., Vol.3, p. 3, L.3.) Post-conviction counsel told the district court 
he would need ninety days in order to be adequately prepared. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.3, 
Ls.4-5.) The district court flatly refused to give post-conviction counsel that much time, 
setting the matter for a hearing some forty days out. (Tr., Vol.3, p.3, L.6 - p.4, L.11.) At 
that subsequent hearing, Mr. Olson told the district court that he had not had sufficient 
time to prepare for the hearing, and post-conviction counsel requested more time to 
complete those preparations. (Tr., Vol.4, p.12. L.25 - p.14, L.24; Tr., Vol.4, p.31, 
L22 - p.32, L.B.) 
The district court decided to proceed with the hearing with the purpose of 
"narrow[ing] some of the issues down" on which the case would proceed, given post-
conviction counsel's representation that there were some issues Mr. Olson no longer 
wished to pursue and based on the Court of Appeals' ruling. (Tr., Vol.4, p.18, Ls.6-7.) 
As such, it told counsel "Here's what the Court's going to order in this case ... I think 
ti-le Court of Appeals either wanted to give Mr. Olson an opportunity to either present 
legal argument upon or evidence upon or to amend. And so I'm going to -- I want to go 
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through what is going to be pursued by Mr. Olson today, and then what we're going 
to do is set this at a later date." (Tr., Vol.4, p.17, L.7-17.) No witnesses besides 
Mr. Olson were called to testify at the June 15, 2012, hearing. ( See generally, Tr., 
Vol.4.) Nevertheless, the district court described that hearing as an evidentiary 
hearing.3 (R., Vol.2, p.130.) 
Post-conviction counsel indicated to the district court that his intent was "to put 
Mr. Olson on the stand and have him go through basically the original petition ... [to] 
have Mr. Olson testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of those claims." 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.24.) The point of doing that, according to post-conviction 
counsel, was to assist the district court "in elucidating what it is [Mr. Olson] wants to ... 
assert here." (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.15-18.) The district court attempted to clarify the 
claims in a discussion with post-conviction counsel instead. (See generally Tr., Vol.4, 
p.18, L.10 - p.27, L.15.) When post-conviction counsel asked for the opportunity to 
discuss answers in that regard with his client, the district court told him "no." (See, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.4, p.27, Ls.12-15.) Ultimately, post-conviction counsel's attempts to summarize 
the claims, which were less than clear, led the district court to decide, "perhaps we out 
to just go ahead and hear [Mr. Olson's] position on each of these matters, and I can 
hear it out." (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.19-21.) 
Mr. Olson proceeded to testify as to each of the claims raised in his original 
petitions. (See generally Tr., Vol.4, p.31, L.1 - p.94, L.24.) For example, in regard to 
Issue B, he testified that his decision to plead guilty had been based on a promise made 
3 The Register of Actions only describes this as a hearing "for Post Conviction Relief." 
(See R., Vol.2, p.5.) However, the minutes from the statu~ hearing on May 2, 2012, 
indicate it was intended to be an evidentiary hearing. (Augmentation - Minutes from 
May 2, 2012, hearing). 
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by his first trial attorney regarding the sentence he would receive. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.19 
- p.40, L.16.) The district court questioned him about that claim, relying on the guilty 
plea questionnaire, and ultimately dismissed the claim based on the information in the 
questionnaire. (Tr., Vol.4, p.53, Ls.7-13; see generally Tr., Vol.4, pp.41-54.) 
In regard to Issue C, Mr. Olson clarified that his initial claim, which was that the 
State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, was more properly characterized as a 
claim of ineffective assistance on the part of his first trial attorney for failing to 
investigate a potential witness who, Mr. Olson asserted, would be able to give testimony 
which he believed would undermine the reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.54, Ls.3-23.) The district court dismissed that claim because no evidence 
was presented at the preliminary hearing which would support Mr. Olson's assertion. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.59, L.20 - p.60, L.6.) 
In regard to Issue 0, which asserted that the district court erred by accepting 
Mr. Olson's guilty plea without inquiring as to the incomplete answers, particularly, 
Mr. Olson's response to the "promise" question, the district court determined that he had 
not alleged a violation of his constitutional rights or ineffective assistance of counsel in 
making that assertion, and so dismissed that claim. (Tr., Vol.4, p.88, L.18 - p.89, L.4.) 
After the June 15, 2012, hearing, the district court entered an order denying 
Mr. Olson's post-conviction claims. (R., Vol.2, pp.13-14.) Mr. Olson filed a timely notice 
of appeal from that order. (R., Vol.2, pp.17-19.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred by not affording Mr. Olson sufficient time to 
discuss his potential claims with post-conviction counsel so that he might develop 
them into viable post-conviction claims, which was the point of the Court of 
Appeals' decision to remand this case following the initial, inappropriate summary 
dismissal of those claims. 
2. Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Olson's petition 
for post-conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine issue of material fact. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Not Affording Mr. Olson Sufficient Time To Discuss 
His Potential Claims With Post-Conviction Counsel So That He Might Develop 
Them Into Viable Post-Conviction Claims, Which Was The Point Of The Court Of 
Appeals' Decision To Remand This Case Following The Initial, Inappropriate 
Summary Dismissal Of Those Claims 
A Introduction 
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's initial order summarily 
dismissing Mr. Olson's post-conviction claims because the district court erroneously 
dismissed them before deciding whether Mr. Olson deserved the assistance of counsel 
to help develop those initial assertions into viable claims for post-conviction relief. On 
remand, the district court's decisions continued to effectively deprive Mr. Olson of that 
assistance, even though he had articulated at least one potentially-valid claim for post-
conviction relief. Therefore, the district court's new order, which effectively summarily 
dismissed those claims again without affording Mr. Olson the assistance of counsel, 
thwarted the purpose of the initial remand and should be reversed. The case should be 
remanded for proper proceedings after Mr. Olson is given sufficient time to consult with 
the post-conviction counsel from whom he has need of assistance to pursue his claims 
for post-conviction relief. 
8. The District Court Did Not Give Mr. Olson Sufficient Time To Consult With Post-
Conviction Counsel Regarding Viable Post-Conviction Claims, Thereby Depriving 
Him Of The Assistance Of Post-Conviction Counsel 
While there is no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel in Idaho, see, 
e.g., Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 723 (1998), a petitioner claiming post-conviction 
relief is entitled to the assistance of counsel when he presents at least one non-frivolous 
claim for relief. See, e.g., Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 653-54 (2007). As such, the 
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Court of Appeals determined that the district court erroneously summarily dismissed 
Mr. Olson's original petition for post-conviction relief without first determining whether he 
was entitled to the assistance of counsel on those claims, and so reversed the dismissal 
and remanded the case for further proceedings in that regard. Olson II, 2012 
Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9. 
The reason behind the Court of Appeals decision is .that "the trial court should 
keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be 
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged 
because they do not exist, the also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner 
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim." Swader, 143 Idaho 
at 653-54 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001 )); Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004). Therefore, part of post-conviction counsel's job is to 
perfect the initial claims from the original petition, which, as the Idaho Supreme Court 
has recognized, may be incomplete in regard to the proof of the elements of the claims. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-54; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93. As a result, the Court 
of Appeals determined that Mr. Olson's original claims needed to be evaluated for 
validity and counsel should have been appointed to help him develop and present those 
claims. See Olson II, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9; see also Swader, 
143 Idaho 653-54; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93. 
On remand, the district court determined that Mr. Olson was entitled to the 
assistance of counsel to develop the claims from his original petition into valid claims for 
post-conviction relief. (See R., p.9.) It did not, however, afford Mr. Olson a sufficient 
opportunity to discuss his claims with post-conviction counsel so that counsel could 
assist him in the prosecution of those claims. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.25 - p.13, 
9 
L.9; Tr., Vol.4, p.31, L22 - p.33, L.24.) Once counsel is appointed in a post-conviction 
case, he should be afforded sufficient time to help the petitioner marshal his evidence. 
See January v. State, 127 Idaho 634, 638 (Ct. App. 1995). The United States Supreme 
Court has concisely affirmed this principle: "[t]he defendant needs counsel and counsel 
needs time." Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278 (1945). Therefore, when the petitioner 
and counsel are not afforded adequate time to consult or investigate the potential 
claims, the petitioner is deprived of the assistance of post-conviction counsel. See, id.; 
see also Brescia v. New Jersey, 417 U.S. 92·1, 94 S. Ct. 2630, 2632-33 (1974) (Justices 
Marshall and Brennan dissenting from the decision to deny certiorari, discussing the 
deprivation of the right to counsel caused by depriving the defendant of an adequate 
time to prepare for hearings); cf January, 127 Idaho at 638 (finding only that the 
petitioner was not entitled to relief because there was evidence that he had indicated he 
had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing and had not shown prejudice, not that he 
did not have the right to sufficient time to prepare). 
The need to provide sufficient time for preparation 1s particularly important in 
post-conviction proceedings because of the nature of those proceedings. They are civil 
in nature. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 215, 217 (2009). As such, the petitioner bears 
the burden of proving each element of his claims. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583 
(2000). Therefore, part of post-conviction counsel's job is to perfect the initial claims 
from the original petition, which, as the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, may be 
incomplete in regard to the proof of the elements of the claims. Swader, 143 Idaho at 
653-54; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93. Obviously, in order for counsel to fulfill that 
obligation, he must first understand the claims that the petitioner was trying to raise. 
That is accomplished by having sufficient time to discuss the claims with the client. 
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Then, the post-conviction attorney needs time to research the claims and gather 
evidence in support in order to fulfill his purpose. Cf id. Therefore, the principle 
articulated in Hawk is prominent in post-conviction cases, and needs to be upheld so 
that post-conviction attorneys can actually do their job. 
Furthermore, even though there is not a constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings in Idaho per se, when post-
conviction counsel is unable to adequately raise and pursue the petitioner's claims, that 
deficient performance may deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present 
his claims. 4 Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 and 189 n.3 (Ct. App. 2008); Griffin 
v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, where post-conviction counsel 
is unable to perform effectively, it deprives the petitioner of his constitutional right to due 
process. Id.; see Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("[F]ailing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to 
have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process."); see also Bradbury 
v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72 (2001) (quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 
Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91 (1999)) (defining procedural due process, protected by 
4 Despite the distinction, some Idaho opinions have referred to such issues as claims of 
"ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel." See, e.g., Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 
411, 420 (Ct. App. 2005). As the Idaho Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted a 
standard regarding adequate performance of post-conviction counsel in this regard, 
Mr. Olson assumes that the Idaho courts would apply the two-part test from Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984), requiring him to prove that post-conviction 
counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard and· that he was prejudiced by 
that deficient performance. Inadequate preparation may constitute unreasonable 
performance. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496 (1999); Murphy v. State, 
143 Idaho 139, 145-46 (Ct. App. 2006). As Mr. Olson's claims were dismissed without 
post-conviction counsel's understanding of them due to the district court's refusal to 
grant him sufficient time to prepare, Mr. Olson was prejudiced by the lack of sufficient 
preparation. 
11 
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 as the right of the party to be '"provided with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.' The opportunity to be heard must occur 'at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner' .... "). 
First, post-conviction counsel indicated, after the case had been remanded from 
the Court of Appeals, he would need ninety days to adequately prepare himself to 
proceed on the claims in the original petition. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.3, Ls.3-5.) The district 
court, however, flatly refused to grant counsel that time. (Tr., Vol.3, p.3, Ls.6-7.) 
Rather, it only gave counsel approximately forty days, even though it was aware of the 
other issues on post-conviction counsel's schedule (which included a case set for 
trial for the same week as the post-conviction hearing), to prepare for the hearing. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.1 - p.4, L.15.) As a result of the district court's decision, post-
conviction counsel was going to be hard-pressed from the outset to be adequately 
prepared to assist Mr. Olson in pursuing his claims for post-conviction relief 
The transcript from that hearing, which was held as scheduled on June 15, 2012, 
demonstrates that post-conviction counsel did not fully understand Mr. Olson's claims, 
nor was he, at that point, able to effectively assist Mr. Olson in the prosecution of those 
claims. For example, post-conviction counsel's intention for that hearing was "to put 
Mr. Olson on the stand and have him go through basically the original petition ... have 
Mr. Olson testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of those claims." 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.24.) The point of doing that, according to post-conviction 
counsel, was to assist the district court "in elucidating what it is [Mr. Olson] wants to ... 
assert here." (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.15-18 (emphasis added).) Post-conviction counsel's 
lack of full understanding of Mr. Olson's claims was also demonstrated by his attempts 
5 U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
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to summarize those claims at the district court's request, which led to the district court's 
determination that "[w]ell, perhaps we ought to just go ahead and hear [Mr. Olson's] 
position on each of these matters and I can hear it out." (See Tr., Vol. 4, p.18 
L.6 - p.28, L.21; compare, p.31, L.8 - p.94, L.22 (Mr. Olson's clarifications of his 
claims)). Furthermore, the only legal support offered on any of the claims had 
to be provided by Mr. Olson, not post-conviction counsel.6 (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.72, 
L.25 - p.74, L.6; see generally Tr., Vol.4.) Most of the time, it was Mr. Olson, not post-
conviction counsel, making the arguments in support of the claims. (See generally Tr., 
Vol.4.) The result is that Mr. Olson was essentially left to fend for himself in regard to 
his claims for post-conviction relief. Therefore, counsel's actions at that hearing 
demonstrate that Mr. Olson was not afforded the meaningful opportunity to pursue his 
claims, as required by the constitutional protection of due process.7 See, e.g., 
Schwartz, 145 Idaho at 189 n.3. 
There is no need to show specific prejudice in this case because it is not possible 
to know what claims would have been pursued had Mr. Olson actually been afforded 
the assistance of counsel or the result of those claims. Regardless, since the point of 
post-conviction counsel is to assist the petitioner in pursuing valid claims for relief, the 
fact that Mr. Olson was deprived of the assistance of counsel itself shows prejudice. 
However, if there is a need for a specific showing of prejudice, as will be discussed in 
detail in Section II, infra, Mr. Olson did articulate one genuine issue of material fact, 
meaning he had a valid claim for post-conviction relief. There was also the possibility 
6 Mr. Olson admitted that his research had not been particularly effective because 
he did not have access to sufficient information to provide more. (Tr., Vol.4, p.80, 
L.23 - p.81, L.1.) 
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that, with the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, he could have raised a 
second valid issue, which is discussed in detail in note 8, infra. Therefore, the 
deprivation of the assistance of counsel prejudiced Mr. Olson. 
11. 
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Olson's Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief In The Face Of At Least One Genuine Issue Of Material Fact 
A. Introduction 
When the petitioner in post-conviction articulates a genuine issue of material fact 
which, if resolved in his favor, summary dismissal of that claim is inappropriate; it must 
be litigated at an evidentiary hearing. In this case, Mr. Olson's petition, with the 
clarifications he made at the June 15, 2012, hearing, raised a genuine issue of material 
fact - that his guilty plea had been premised on the promise made by his first trial 
attorney regarding the sentence he would receive. This, Mr. Olson asserted, 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, the district court summarily 
dismissed that claim. This Court should reverse that decision and remand for an 
evidentiary hearing in that regard. 
8. Mr. Olson Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And Is Entitled To An 
Evidentiary Hearing As A Result 
The appointment of counsel on the original petition was appropriate since 
Mr. Olson raised the possibility of a valid claim in his initial petition (as explained at the 
June 15, 2012, hearing).8 When there are genuine issues of material fact presented by 
7 This also demonstrates the unreasonable performance under the first prong of 
Strickland. 
8 There was the possibility that, had post-conviction counsel been afforded a sufficient 
amount of time to discuss the issues with Mr. Olson, so that he understood the claims 
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the petitioner's claims which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief, "an 
evidentiary hearing must be conducted." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008) 
(emphasis added); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518 (1998). 
When testifying about Issue B during the June 15, 2012, hearing, Mr. Olson 
asserted that his decision to plead guilty was premised, in part, on his first trial 
attorney's promise that he would be sentenced to a fixed term of two to three years, life 
indeterminate, to run concurrently with his other sentence. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.21 - p.40, 
L.2.) "A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character 
of a voluntary act, is void .... Certainly, if an attorney recklessly promises his client that 
a specific sentence will follow upon a guilty plea, . . the question may arise whether 
such assurances were coercive, or whether such representation may be deemed 
constitutionally ineffective." Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970) 
(citations omitted); see Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (holding 
that, when a promise induces the defendant to plead guilty and that promise is not met, 
the defendant is entitled to some form of relief); State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410 
Mr. Olson was trying to pursue, counsel could have amended other of those initial 
statements into valid claims for post-conviction relief. 
For example, in Issue C, Mr. Olson had initially alleged that the State had 
withheld exculpatory evidence regarding a potential witness. (Tr., Vol.4, p.53, Ls.18-23; 
R., Vol.1, p.6.) However, at the June 15, 2012, hearing, Mr. Olson explained that the 
claim actually centered around his initial trial attorney's failure to investigate the 
potential witness, who, according to Mr. Olson, would be able to offer testimony which 
would undermine the reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. (Tr., Vol.4, p.54, 
Ls.3-23.) However, Mr. Olson's offer of proof only indicated that the witness would be 
able to testify that Mr. Olson swerved into the opposite lane to avoid an accident that 
would have been caused by the other driver, not that the officer who initiated the traffic 
stop saw any of this occur. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.54, Ls.3-23.) Nevertheless, had the issue 
been reframed by post-conviction counsel, after being given a sufficient opportunity to 
investigate the claim after gaining this proper understanding of the issue, there is the 
potential for a valid claim in that regard. Thus, the development of Issue C further 
demonstrates the prejudice caused by the district court's decisions, which deprived 
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(Ct. App. 2003) (same); see a/so State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257 (2012) (adopting 
the rationale from Puckett in regard to plea agreements and promises made therein). 
Additionally, where the petitioner alleged that a promise had induced him to plead guilty, 
absent any additional evidence, the United States Supreme Court has held "[t]here can 
be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the petitioner's motion and affidavit are 
true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated." Machibroda v. United States, 368 
U.S. 487, 493 (1962). Therefore, if this issue were resolved in Mr. Olson's favor, he 
would be entitled to relief. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 136; Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493; 
Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257; see a/so Wellnitz, 420 F.2d at 936. 
The district court tried to use the guilty plea questionnaire to disprove that claim. 
(See Tr., Vol.4, p.43, L.2 - p.44, L.3.) The questionnaire, however, was not complete, 
and yet the district court accepted it and did not ask any follow up questions as to the 
inconsistencies therein at the change of plea hearing. (See generally Tr. Vol.6, pp.1-9.) 
And, actually, answers in the questionnaire support Mr. Olson's claim. (See R., Vol.1, 
pp.71-77.) For example, Mr. Olson's response to the question "Have any other 
promises been made to you which have influenced your decision to plead guilty," was 
"Yes." (R., Vol.1 p.74.) The reason, Mr. Olson wrote, was that the State refused to 
negotiate. (R., Vol.1, p.74.) At the June 15, 2012, hearing, he explained that was the 
impetus for his first trial attorney's promise regarding the sentence he would receive if 
he pied guilty, even without the State's agreement. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.19 - p.44, L.3.) 
Therefore, the questionnaire offers proof to support Mr. Olson's claim in Issue B. It 
certainly does not conclusively disprove Mr. Olson's claim. Therefore, summary 
dismissal was inappropriate. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
Mr. Olson and his post-conviction attorney of a sufficient time to coordinate his post-
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The district court's decisions to dismiss the claims at the June 15, 2012, hearing 
are properly classified as summary dismissals, not denials after an evidentiary hearing. 
No other witnesses were called to contest Mr. Olson's statements in support of his 
claims, made under oath. (See generally Tr., Vol.4.) In fact, the district court had 
indicated during the hearing that it was not an evidentiary hearing: the purpose of 
proceeding with the June 15, 2012 hearing, even though Mr. Olson had not had enough 
time to prepare, was to narrow down which issues would be pursued on remand. (Tr., 
Vol.4, p.18, Ls.6-7.) As such, the district court told counsel "Here's what the Court's 
going to order in this case ... I think the Court of Appeals either wanted to give 
Mr. Olson an opportunity to either present legal argument upon or evidence upon or to 
amend. And so I'm going to -- I want to go through what is going to be pursued by 
Mr. Olson today, and then what we're going to do is set this at a later date." (Tr., Vol.4, 
p.17, L.7-17 (emphasis added).) As a result, the only notice given to Mr. Olson was that 
he would be able to clarify his claims and proceed on those. that had not already been 
addressed or which he decided he no longer wished to pursue. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.11, 
L.19 - p.12, L.24; Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.15-18.) Issues that he still wanted to pursue would 
be taken up at a future time. (Tr.,Vol.4, p.17, Ls.16-17.) Therefore, this hearing is 
more properly described as a hearing regarding summary dismissal, not an evidentiary 
hearing.9 Summary dismissal of claims presenting genuine issues of material fact is 
conviction claims. 
9 Even if the district court's description of the June 15, 2012, hearing as an evidentiary 
hearing is correct, that simply adds to the harm done by depriving Mr. Olson of sufficient 
time to prepare. His post-conviction counsel would have· gone into an evidentiary 
hearing without knowing what claims were being raised and pursued, and therefore, it is 
difficult to say that post-conviction counsel was adequately prepared to proceed with 
such a hearing. Since inadequate preparation indicates the attorney's performance was 
deficient, see, e.g., Roberts, 132 Idaho at 496; Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145-46, classifying 
the June 15, 2012, hearing as an evidentiary hearing only reinforces the need to 
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impermissible; an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Berg, 
131 ldahoat518. 
It was only after the fact that the district court tried to change the nature of the 
hearing to an evidentiary hearing. ( See R., Vol.2, p.130.) That should not be permitted, 
as it would deprive Mr. Olson of adequate notice of what he needed to present at that 
hearing without giving him an opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.") 
(emphasis added); State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 545-47 (Ct. App. 2009) (applying 
Mullane to find that the defendant had not been given notice of part of the purpose of 
the hearing, and so reversing the punishment imposed without notice). Therefore, since 
the retroactive restructure would deprive Mr. Olson of effective notice, it should either be 
rejected or should entitle Mr. Olson to a new hearing with proper notice. 
Additionally, the retroactive restructure would deprive Mr. Olson of a meaningful 
opportunity to present his evidence, as he had not been afforded adequate time to 
prepare for that type of hearing. As such, the retroactive restructure would cause a 
deprivation of this aspect of Mr. Olson's constitutional right to due process as well. See 
Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72; Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91; Schwarlz, 
145 Idaho at 189 and 189 n.3; Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441. Therefore, if the retroactive 
restructure of the hearing is permitted, the district court's decisions must be reversed 
remand this case for a proper hearing held after Mr. Olson is afforded sufficient time to 
prepare. 
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and remanded because that hearing would have deprived Mr. Olson of his constitutional 
right to due process. See id.; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Doe, 147 Idaho at 545-47. 
As a result, this Court should reverse the district court's decisions in this case. 
The district court thwarted the purpose of the Court of Appeals' initial decision 
remanding this matter by effectively depriving Mr. Olson of the assistance of post-
conviction counsel by not affording him sufficient time to prepare for the hearing. That 
prejudiced Mr. Olson because he articulated at least one genuine issue of material fact, 
which was erroneously summarily dismissed nonetheless. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Olson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief and remand so that he may have 
sufficient time to consult with post-conviction counsel and present the other viable 
issues at an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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